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Comment
A Critique of Torcasio v. Murray and the Use of the
Clear Statement Rule to Interpret the Americans with
Disabilities Act
Laura E. Walvoord*
Anthony Torcasio was 5'7" and weighed 460 pounds when he
entered Virginia's Keen Mountain Correctional Center in April
1993.1 Suffering from morbid obesity, he described his exis-
tence as "a life of misery and heartache."' He was unable to
walk long distances, incapable of standing or lying down for long
periods, and susceptible to losing his balance.4  Torcasio
requested that Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC)
officials make certain changes in his cell, bathroom facilities, and
recreational areas and activities to accommodate his disability,5
but VDOC officials declined to do so.' Torcasio then sued VDOC
officials under Title IV of the Americans with Disabilities Act
* J.D. Candidate 1997, University of Minnesota Law School; MA. 1987,
University of California at Berkeley; B.A. 1985, Lawrence University.
1. Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1342 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 772 (1996).
2. Morbid obesity is obesity "sufficient to prevent normal activity or
physiologic fimction, or to cause the onset of a pathologic condition." STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1076 (25th ed. 1990).
3. Torcasio, 57 F.3d at 1342 (quoting plaintiff's memorandum to district
court).
4. Id.
5. Id. Torcasio alleged that the Keen Mountain facilities violated his
constitutional and statutory rights. Specifically, he claimed that the prison's
shower, toilet, tables, cell doors, building lobby, dining hall, commissary window
and pill line, cells, and infirmary, and its recreational programming, medical
transportation, and personal aid all failed to accommodate his obesity
reasonably. Torcasio v. Murray, 862 F. Supp. 1482, 1486-89 (E.D. Va. 1994),
affd in part and revd in part, 57 F.3d 1340 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 772 (1996).
6. Torcasio, 57 F.3d at 1342. The prison did provide Torcasio with a
private cell, a hospital bed, reinforced chairs, and handrails and slip mats in the
shower. Id. at 1356.
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134 (1994).
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(ADA),8 which prohibits state and local government entities from
discriminating on the basis of disability. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, held that
VDOC officials were entitled to qualified immunity because at
the time of Torcasio's suit the ADA's applicability to state
prisons and prisoners was not clearly established law.'0
Torcasio is the first judicial decision to hold that Title II of
the ADA does not clearly cover state prisons, thereby protecting
state prison administrators from liability damages for failing to
accommodate prisoners with disabilities." More significantly,
the Torcasio court's application of the clear statement rule in
interpreting Title II is unprecedented. 2 The case's emphasis
on protecting traditional areas of state authority at the expense
of federal antidiscrimination legislation also creates troubling
precedent, because the court's reasoning calls into question the
ADA's applicability to other traditional realms of state and local
authority beyond state prisons. 8
This Comment argues that the Torcasio court erred in its
use of the clear statement rule to analyze the scope of Title II of
the ADA. Part I reviews the provisions and purpose of Title II
of the ADA, and explores the history and application of the clear
statement rule. Part II analyzes the reasoning of the Torcasio
decision. Part III posits that the Torcasio court could have
reached the same result on narrower grounds because both Title
II and the qualified immunity doctrine allow courts to consider
prison security and other administrative concerns while
assessing the reasonableness of accommodating an inmate with
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). Torcasio also brought claims under
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Torcasio, 862 F. Supp. at 1489.
9. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(A), 12131(1)(A)-(B), 12132.
10. Torcasio, 57 F.3d at 1343. The court also held that it was not clearly
established that the ADA protects people with obesity. Id. at 1354-55.
11. At least one court explicitly held that Title II does apply to state
prisons. See Outlaw v. City of Dothan, No. CV-92-A-1219-S, 1993 WL 735802,
at *3-*4 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 27, 1993); see also infra notes 74-75 and accompanying
text (discussing the Outlaw court's application of Title II's coverage provisions
to prisons). In other cases brought under Title II, courts have presumed that
the ADA included state prisons among covered entities. See infra notes 33-34
and accompanying text (discussing ADA prisoner cases).
12. See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text (discussing courts'
reluctance to use the clear statement rule and rationes utilized to avoid the
doctrine).
13. See infra Part III.C.2. (describing the ramifications of the Torcasio
court's analysis on subsequent cases interpreting the scope of Title II).
INTERPRETING THE ADA
disabilities. Part III argues further that courts should not use
the clear statement rule in interpreting Title II of the ADA.
This Comment concludes that the Torcasio court incorrectly
analyzed the ADA's applicability to state prisons, thereby
creating a flawed analytical framework with potentially far-
reaching and dangerous implications for the federal
government's power to remedy discrimination against people
with disabilities.
I. INTERPRETING THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT
The Torcasio decision relied on the clear statement rule and
its role in preserving state autonomy in administering core state
functions 4 without referring to the important history and
purpose of the ADA. 5 A review of the text, legislative history,
purpose, and social context of the ADA illustrates the adverse
impact Torcasio's reasoning poses to any judicial interpretation
of the ADA. This Part also examines the clear statement rule
and the federal courts application of the rule, as well as prisoner
suits brought under federal antidiscrimination laws.
A. TITLE II OF THE ADA
The ADA is the broadest, most far-reaching civil rights
legislation enacted since the Civil Rights Act of 1964.16 Earlier
14. Torcasio, 57 F.3d at 1344-45.
15. The Torcasio court set forth the relevant portions of Title II and
immediately discussed why it had to employ the clear statement rule to
interpret the text. Id. at 1344-45. The court never cited the legislative history
of the ADA or the history of discrimination against people with disabilities that
prompted Congress to pass the Act. Instead, it simply speculated whether
Congress would have wanted Title II to apply throughout state prisons or only
to those areas of prisons accessible to the public. Id. at 1346 & n.5.
16. See Nathaniel C. Nash, Bush and Senate Leaders Support Sweeping
Protection for Disabled, N.Y. T]MEs, Aug. 3, 1989, at Al (quoting Ralph G. Neas,
Executive Director of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, who termed
the ADA "the most comprehensive civil rights measure in the past two and a
half decades"). Testifying before Congress, disability activist Judith Heumann
stated: "[Tihe passage of this monumental legislation will make it clear that our
Government will no longer allow the largest minority group in the United
States to be denied equal opportunity." H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 2, 49 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 331.
The ADA's coverage includes employment, public services, public
accommodations, public transportation, and telecommunications. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213. Although patterned after earlier civil rights statutes,
commentators characterized the ADA as a "second-generation civil rights
1996] 1185
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legislation prohibiting discrimination against people with
disabilities had created a patchwork of covered entities based on
the receipt of federal funding.'7 Title II of the ADA expanded
federal civil rights protection for the disabled by establishing
uniform provisions applicable to all state and local government
entities. 8
Congress intended the ADA to provide "clear, strong,
consistent, [and] enforceable standards," 9 and to give the
federal government the central role in enforcing the ADA's
provisions."0 Congress believed that the scope of the problems
facing people with disabilities justified the broad scope of the
statute that goes beyond the 'naked framework' of earlier statutes and adds
much flesh and refinement to traditional nondiscrimination law." Robert L.
Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of
a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 415
(1991).
17. Title II was modeled on § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by any entity that receives
federal funding. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). Title II extends § 504's
antidiscrimination provisions to include all "services, programs, and activities
provided or made available by State and local governments or any of their
instrumentalities or agencies, regardless of the receipt of Federal financial
assistance." 28 C.F.R. § 35, app. A at 439 (1995). Title I's enforcement
provisions state that the "remedies, procedures, and rights" set forth in the
remedies provision for § 504 are those available to plaintiffs alleging discrimi-
nation under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (1994).
Because the ADA was designed to incorporate and build on case law
interpreting the Rehabilitation Act, courts generally have applied the reasoning
of decisions construing the Rehabilitation Act to controversies arising under the
ADA. See, e.g., Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 851 F. Supp. 353,
359 (W.D. Wis. 1994) ("Given the relationship between the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act and the dearth of case law interpreting the ADA, courts have
relied on Rehabilitation Act cases as guides to the meaning of the ADA."), affd,
44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995); Easley v. Snider, 841 F. Supp. 668, 672 (E.D. Pa.
1993) ("[Plast interpretations of the Rehabilitation Act are persuasive authority
for ADA interpretations."), rev'd on other grounds, 36 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 1994).
18. "[Tlitle II applies to anything a public entity does. ... [C]overage,
however, is not limited to 'Executive' agencies but includes activities of the
legislative and judicial branches of State and local governments." 28 C.F.R.
§ 35, app. A at 439-40 (1994). Neither the statute nor its implementing
regulations list specific state entities or agencies that are specifically exempted
from or included in Title H's coverage. In contrast, Title I, dealing with
employment, contains explicit exceptions to its broad applicability including the
federal government, Indian tribes, and private clubs. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B).
Likewise, Title III, dealing with accommodations, lists twelve categories of
covered private entities. Id. § 12181(7)(A)-(L).
19. Id. § 12101(b)(2).
20. Id. § 12101(b)(3).
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ADA.2 In preparing to draft the ADA, the Congressional Task
Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with
Disabilities held fact-finding forums in each state and met with
over 32,000 people before making formal findings of "massive,
society-wide discrimination."22 Moreover, Congress found that
people who suffered discrimination because of a disability often
had no legal remedies, unlike members of other constitutionally
or statutorily protected groups. 23
Title II's reasonable accommodation requirement,24 expan-
sive language, and the lack of exemptions from coverage allowed
people to sue state and local government entities that had not
been subject to the Rehabilitation Act and other earlier
antidiscrimination legislation. Under Title II, plaintiffs with
disabilities have successfully challenged laws and policies
traditionally considered within the states' police power, including
21. One of the [ADA bill's] most impressive strengths is its comprehen-
sive character. Over the last twenty years, civil rights laws protecting
disabled persons have been enacted in piecemeal fashion. Thus,
existing Federal laws are like a patchwork quilt in need of repair.
There are holes in the fabric, serious gaps in coverage that leave
persons with disabilities without adequate civil rights protections.
H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 16, at 48, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 330 (testimony
of then-Attorney General Dick Thornburgh).
22. Id. at 31-32 (testimony of Justin Dart, Chairperson of the Task Force
on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities).
23. Id. § 12101(a)(4). See generally Timothy M. Cook, The Americans With
Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 393, 399-414 (1991)
(discussing the historical segregation, isolation, and degradation of the disabled
in this country).
24. Courts analyzing the reasonableness of a modification or accommo-
dation have looked at whether the requested modification would change the
entire focus of a program. See, e.g., Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297, 305 (3d Cir.
1994). The Easley court rejected the plaintiff's request that the state expand
its provision of personal care attendants to clients with disabilities who were
not able to direct their own care. Id. at 299-300. The court wrote, "[tihe
proposed alteration would create a program that the State, never envi-
sioned .... The modification would create an undue and perhaps impossible
burden on the State, possibly jeopardizing the whole program, by forcing it to
provided attendant care services to all physically disabled individuals, whether
or not mentally alert." Id. at 305; see also Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439,
1446-47 (9th Cir. 1994) (analyzing the reasonable of modifications for HIV-
positive inmates).
25. "Because many State and local government operations, such as courts,
licensing, and legislative facilities and proceedings do not receive Federal finds,
they are beyond the reach of section 504." U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT TITLE H TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL (Supp. 11994).
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marriage regulations,26 social service placements," zoning
ordinances, 8 jury selection criteria,29 and state bar licensing
procedures."
Although the text of Title II uses a broad, inclusive defi-
nition of public entity,"' testimony before Congress nonetheless
included the plight of state inmates with disabilities. 2 Despite
26. See, e.g., T.E.P. v. Leavitt, 840 F. Supp. 110, 111 (D. Utah 1993)
(invalidating state law that voided marriage by persons with AIDS).
27. See, e.g., Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325,336-39 (3d Cir.) (holding that
Title II requires state social service agency to implement reasonably integrated
services for clients with disabilities), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 64 (1995).
28. See, e.g., City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, 115 S. Ct. 1776, 1783 (1995)
(holding that federal statute prohibiting discrimination in housing based on
disability should be interpreted to allow challenge to city zoning provision that
limited the number of unrelated occupants allowed in a dwelling because the
provision failed to accommodate reasonably a group home for recovering
addicts); see also infra notes 172-173 and accompanying text (discussing the
significance of the Oxford House majority's rejection of the clear statement rule
in interpreting federal antidiscrimination legislation).
29. See, e.g., Galloway v. Superior Court, 816 F. Supp. 12,20 (D.D.C. 1993)
(holding that blanket exclusion of blind people from jury pool violates the ADA);
People v. Caldwell, 603 N.Y.S.2d 713, 716 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1993) (holding that
court had obligation under ADA to reasonably accommodate potential juror's
visual impairment).
30. See, e.g., Ellen S. v. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 859 F. Supp. 1489,
1494-95 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (holding that Tenth Amendment posed no independent
bar to application of ADA to state regulation of attorneys); cf Medical Soc'y v.
Jacobs, No. Civ. A. 93-3670 (WGB), 1993 WL 413016, at *7-*8 (D.N.J. Oct. 5,
1993) (holding that State Board of Medical Examiners' investigation of mental
health history of medical license applicants violated Title U by placing
additional burdens on applicants with disabilities).
31. In drafting Title II, Congress deliberately chose not to list all types of
actions that constitute discriminatory conduct by public services. H.R. REP No.
485, supra note 16, at 84, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 367. Congress did not include
such lists because Title II "essentially simply extends the anti-discrimination
prohibition embodied in section 504 to all actions of state and local govern-
ments." Id. Title II, therefore, does not include a list of exclusions like those
given in Title I (Employment) or a list of specifically covered entities like Title
III (Public Accommodations) of the ADA. See supra note 18 (discussing specific
exemptions and inclusions in Titles I and III).
32. A witness describing the types of training public employees might have
to undergo to sensitize them to disability issues used the example of persons
with epilepsy who are wrongfully arrested because police officers are unable to
distinguish seizure disorders from public drunkenness or drug withdrawal.
H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 3, supra note 16, at 50, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,473. He
testified that, "often, after being arrested, they are deprived of medications
while in jail, resulting in further seizures. Such discriminatory treatment based
on disability can be avoided by proper training." Id. (emphasis added).
At least one suit based on a similar scenario was brought under Title II.
A man suffering from certain physical disabilities caused by a stroke was
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the lack of explicit references to inmates in Title Irs text or
implementing regulations, some courts permitted state prisoners
to bring,33 and win, 4 Title II actions against correctional
facilities for failing to accommodate their disabilities.
B. THE CLEAR STATEMENT RULE
Over the past thirty years, expansion of congressional power
under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause
permitted federal antidiscrimination statutes to regulate areas
wrongfully arrested for public drunkenness and sued the city and the arresting
officer. Jackson v. Inhabitants of Town of Sanford, No. Civ. 94-12-P-H, 1994
WL 589617, at *1 (D. Me. Sept. 23, 1994). The court held that the town and its
police force were public entities within the meaning of Title H and thus denied
defendants' motion for summary judgment as to claims brought under the ADA.
Id. at *6.
33. See Dean v. Knowles, No. 94-14227-CIV, 1995 WL 791947, at *2 (S.D.
Fla. Jan. 8, 1996) (denying summary judgment to prison officials who denied
trustee position to HIV-positive inmate); Rewolinski v. Morgan, 896 F. Supp.
879, 881 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (permitting deaf inmate to sue under federal civil
rights statute for alleged violations of Title II); Harrelson v. Elmore County, 859
F. Supp. 1465, 1468 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (permitting all of paraplegic inmate's
claims under ADA to survive motion to dismiss except claim for punitive
damages); Noland v. Wheatley, 835 F. Supp. 476, 482-83 (N.D. Ind. 1993)
(holding that semi-quadriplegic inmate who was denied access to soap and
water to clean his colostomy and urostomy bags stated a claim for relief under
Title II against county sheriff and jail officials); Outlaw v. City of Dothan, No.
CV-92-A-1219-S, 1993 WL 735802, at *3-*4 (M.D. Ala., Apr. 27, 1993) (holding
explicitly that Title II of ADA covers state and local correctional facilities).
Disability rights advocates suggest that the number of inmates with
disabilities will grow due to the increase in mandatory life sentences and a
corresponding aging of the prison population. Elaine Gardner, The Legal Rights
of Inmates with Physical Disabilities, 14 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 175, 177
(1994) (citingAs Prison Population Grows, So, Too Could ADA Lawsuits, NAT'L
DIsABiLrrY L. REP., Feb. 16, 1994, at 6).
34. See, e.g., Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F. Supp. 1019, 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(holding that the New York Department of Correctional Services had failed to
accommodate inmates with disabilities in multiple aspects of its facilities and
programming, including "failure to make reasonable accommodations to
facilitate full participation by class members in education, vocational and
rehabilitative contexts"). The Clarkson court held that the New York
Department of Correctional Services had failed to reasonably accommodate deaf
and hearing-impaired inmates in education and counselling programs in two
ways. First, the Department placed inmates in settings "where, without an
accommodation, their opportunity to benefit is wholly unequal to that of non-
disabled inmates." Id. at 1047. Second, the Department's internal regulations
explicitly excluded inmates from programs based on their disability, without
regard to accommodation or modification. Id.
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formerly within the sole power of the states." In many ways,
the ADA extended the protections of major civil rights legislation
to people with disabilities."5 While Congress expanded its role
into areas of traditional state police power, the Supreme Court
struggled to promote federalist values and protect state sover-
eignty from increasing federal intrusion. Although the Tenth
Amendment's status as an affirmative constitutional limit on
congressional power appears moribund,37 the Court increasingly
promoted statutory interpretation as a tool to preserve the
federalist balance between the states and Congress.
8
In a variety of contexts related to state sovereignty, the
Court developed and applied permutations of a "clear statement
rule"39 of statutory interpretation. 40 The clear statement rule,
35. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 83 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3631 (1988)) (prohibiting discrimination in
housing, zoning and land use); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)
(noting that Court has "sanctioned intrusions by Congress, acting under the
Civil War Amendments, into the judicial, executive, and legislative spheres of
autonomy previously reserved to the States"); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 258, 261 (1964) (holding that Public Accommodations
provision of Civil Rights Act of 1964 is valid exercise of Congress's commerce
power as applied to motel catering to out-of-state guests).
36. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (discussing ADA's
relationship to earlier civil rights legislation and Congress's intention that
victims of disability discrimination have available remedies like those for
victims of race and gender discrimination).
37. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556-
57 (1985) (holding that "core [state] governmental functions" and "fundamental
attributes of state sovereignty" do not create affirmative limits on Congress's
power under Commerce Clause). But see United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct.
1624, 1634 (1995) (invalidating federal criminal statute as beyond scope of
Congress's Commerce power).
38. Commentators have described the Court's development of "super-strong
clear statement rules" designed to promote federalist values on the sub-
constitutional level of statutory interpretation. William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 619-29 (1992). Eskridge and
Frickey criticize the Court for using federalism-based clear statement rules
without grappling with why federalism values should supersede individual
rights and public policies. Id. at 643-44.
39. The clear statement rule also is called the "plain statement rule."
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991).
40. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) ("Unless Congress
conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed
the federal-state balance."). During the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court
has used clear statement rules to counter congressional intrusions on state
sovereignty.
Early in its use of the clear statement rule, the Court stated that an
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like other canons of statutory interpretation, is a judge-made
tool used to interpret ambiguous statutory text.41  The rule
creates a presumption that if Congress seeks to impinge on
areas of traditional state sovereignty, it must make explicit its
intent to do so in the statutory text itself.42  Underlying the
clear statement rule is a normative presumption that Congress
should take its federalist responsibilities seriously enough to put
the states on notice if it intends to disrupt the usual balance of
power between the states and the federal government.4" By
requiring Congress to be explicit, courts protect the states from
congressional action that inadvertently impinges on state
sovereignty.4'
In 1991, the Supreme Court established its most recent and
expansive version of the clear statement rule in Gregory v.
unambiguous articulation in the legislative history of Congress's intent to
encroach on state sovereignty could serve as sufficient indication of congressio-
nal intent. See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343 (1979) (stating that the
Court "consistently... required a clearer showing of congressional purpose to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity") (emphasis added). In holding that
states are immune from suit under section 1983, the Court wrote:
Section 1983 does not explicitly and by clear language indicate on its
face an intent to sweep away the immunity of the States; nor does it
have a history which focuses directly on the question of state liability
and which shows that Congress considered and firmly decided to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States.
Id. at 345.
In subsequent cases involving the preservation of state sovereign immunity
from suit, however, the Court announced that the clear statement of congressio-
nal intent to encroach on state sovereignty must be located in the statutory
text. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1989)
(holding that § 1983 falls "far short" of satisfying "ordinary rule of statutory
construction" that upsetting usual federal-state balance requires unmistakably
clear statutory text and thus finding state immunity from suit in state court);
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) ("Congress may
abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal
court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute." (emphasis added)).
41. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory
Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1027 (1989) (defining clear statement
rules as requirements that courts interpret statutes a certain way unless
Congress clearly expresses contrary intention).
42. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
43. See id. at 461 ("[The] rule is nothing more than an acknowledgement
that the States retain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional
scheme, powers with which Congress does not readily interfere.").
44. For an overview of the Court's increasing reliance on the clear
statement rule, see generally Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 38 (discussing
Court's clear statement canons).
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Ashcroft.45 In Gregory, the Court held that federal statutory
text must contain a clear statement of congressional intent to
disrupt traditional state sovereign authority if the statute's
application "would upset the usual constitutional balance of
federal and state powers."46 Applying the rule, the Court held
that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)47 did
not protect appointed state judges, whose mandatory retirement
age was set forth in the state constitution. 5
A crucial question left undecided in Gregory is how courts
determine which state functions constitute "fundamental
attributes of state sovereignty,"49 and thus require the pro-
45. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). In Gregory, the Court employed the clear
statement rule to interpret the ADEA's "policymaker" exception to its
prohibition on state-mandated retirement ages. Id. at 464-67 (interpreting 29
U.S.C. § 603(b)(2)). The Missouri State Constitution required that appointed
state judges retire at age 70. Id. at 455.
46. Id. at 460.
47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994).
48. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 473.
49. The Court found that decisions regarding who was qualified to be a
state judge were "of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity." Id. at
460. In making this determination, the Court relied on a series of Equal
Protection cases commonly known as the "political function" cases. Id. at 463.
The "political function" doctrine created a realm of lessened judicial scrutiny of
potential Equal Protection violations involving eligibility criteria for important
elected and appointed state officers who perform functions that "go to the heart
of representative government." Id. at 461-63 (citing Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. 634,647) (1973)). While most of the discussion in Gregory revolved around
the applicability of the ADEA to appointed state judges, the Court ultimately
phrased the rule in much more expansive language: "we will not attribute to
Congress an intent to intrude on state governmental functions regardless of
whether Congress acted pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers or § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 470 (emphasis added).
Commentators offered two interpretations of the scope of Gregory's clear
statement rule: that it narrowly supported a state's right to define and enforce
the qualifications of important appointed officials, or that it broadly applied to
any function of state government. See Bruce Dayton Livingston, Gregory v.
Ashcroft: The Supreme Court Announces a New Rule of Statutory Construction
in Deference to Constitutionally Recognized Principles of Federalism, 11 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 234, 256-62 (1992) (discussing the alternatively broad
and narrow ways to interpret Gregory); Deanna L. Ruddock, Note, Gregory v.
Ashcroft: The Plain Statement Rule and Judicial Supervision of Federal-State
Relations, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1563, 1565 (1992) (positing that by failing to explain
how clear statement rule might apply beyond setting qualifications for
appointed state officials, Gregory left lower courts without guidance for
reviewing federal legislation covering state and local governmental entities and
activities).
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tection of the clear statement rule.5" The Supreme Court's
inability to create a workable definition of "traditional govern-
ment functions" protected by the Tenth Amendment led the
Court to reject that classification as a basis for promoting
federalist values under the Constitution.51 Nevertheless, the
use of the clear statement rule to prevent all but the most
explicit congressional incursions on "attributes of state sover-
eignty" or "core state functions" suggests that the Supreme
Court seeks to enforce federalist values via statutory interpreta-
tion in certain circumstances,52 in lieu of the Tenth Amend-
ment.53
Although some commentators predicted courts would apply
50. Justice White's concurrence in Gregory emphasized that the majority
failed to limit the clear statement rule's scope: "Is the rule limited to federal
regulations of the qualifications of state officials? Or does it apply more broadly
to the regulation of any 'state governmental functions'?" Gregory, 501 U.S. at
478 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (internal
citations omitted).
51. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S 528, 531 (1985).
The Court held in National League of Cities v. Usery that applying the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to limit a state's power to structure employer-
employee relations in areas of traditional state authority such as "fire
prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and
recreation" impaired "integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions." 426 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). This intrusion would result in
impermissible interference with "traditional aspects of state sovereignty." 426
U.S. at 849.
In Garcia, however, the Court pointed to the seemingly arbitrary
distinctions between activities found to be "traditional government functions"
and those that were not "traditional government functions." 469 U.S. at 538-39.
The Garcia majority also noted that the emphasis in National League of Cities
on the "traditional," "integral," or "necessary" nature of protected government
functions permitted the federal judiciary to undermine state authority and
sovereignty by substituting its own assessment of the importance of particular
state functions for that of the state itself. Id. at 545-46.
52. Justice O'Connor, author of the majority opinion in Gregory, located the
roots of the clear statement rule in constitutional protections: "The clear
statement rule is not a mere canon of statutory interpretation. Instead, it
derives from the Constitution itself. The rule protects the balance of power
between the States and the Federal Government." Hilton v. South Carolina
Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 209 (1991). O'Connor analogized the clear
statement rule to the Eleventh Amendment, both of which are rooted in, and
help to maintain, the principles of federalism that structure the Constitution.
Id.
53. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 38, at 612 ("'[Q]uasi-constitutional
law,' the reading into statute of constitutional values subject only to clear
legislative override, has replaced constitutional law, the invalidation of federal
statutes, as the way in which the Court is enforcing 'our federalism.'").
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the clear statement rule broadly to hinder enforcement of civil
rights guarantees, 54 the Supreme Court has not employed the
rule since the Gregory decision to limit the scope of federal
antidiscrimination legislation. Lower courts have avoided
application of the clear statement rule in three ways: finding
statutory text sufficiently clear to validate federal regulation of
state functions,55 deeming the state interests involved insuffi-
ciently connected to state sovereignty to warrant the rule's
protections, 6 or declining to apply the rule because of overrid-
ing federal interests involved.5" Significantly, the Court
recently stated in City of Edmonds v. Oxford House that
54. See, e.g., Ruddock, supra note 49, at 1589 ("Gregory may well reflect a
trend, especially in civil rights cases, in which the Court employs a 'plain
meaning' form of statutory interpretation to construe a statute more narrowly
than Congress intended.").
55. See, e.g., Baker v. Cuomo, 58 F.3d 814, 824-25 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating
that Voting Rights Act contains sufficiently clear statement of Congress's intent
to change balance of power between federal government and states to survive
application of clear statement rule).
56. In a case interpreting the applicability of the ADEA to law enforcement
personnel, the First Circuit limited the clear statement rule to federal
legislation impinging on state constitutional officers who participate in the
formulation and execution of broad public policy. Gately v. Massachusetts, 2
F.3d 1221, 1230 (1st Cir. 1993). In finding that the ADEA overrode state-
mandated retirement for state troopers, the court noted the narrowness of
Gregory's holding: "at no point did the Court suggest that all state regulations
of public employees are questions of state sovereignty." Id. (citation omitted).
Both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits rejected applying the clear statement
rule to a federal civil forfeiture law for real property used to commit narcotics
crimes to preempt state homesteading laws. See United States v. Lot 5, Fox
Grove, 23 F.3d 359, 362 (11th Cir. 1994) (concluding that federal preemption of
state's homestead protection provision does not affect state sovereignty within
meaning of Gregory because "homestead protection is a substantive policy
choice, not a means of sovereign definition"); First Gibraltar Bank v. Morales,
19 F.3d 1032, 1040 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Although the regulation of real property
may be a matter of special concern to the states, it does not seem to us to strike
'at the heart of representative government' in the same way that the ADEA did
in Gregory." (citation omitted)).
57. At least one lower court rejected outright the application of the clear
statement rule to the Voting Rights Act. League of United Latin Am. Citizens,
Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 986 F.2d 728, 758-60 (5th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter
LULAC]; see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v.
Clements, 914 F.2d 620,641-42 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Congress has clearly expressed
the [Voting Rights] Act's application to the states .... The Act, with all of its
intrusive effect, has been made to apply to the states".) (Higginbotham, J.,
concurring in judgment), rev'd and remanded, Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v.
Attorney Gen., 501 U.S. 419 (1991).
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antidiscrimination laws warrant "generous construction."8
C. STATE PRISONERS' FEDERAL STATUTORY CIVIL RIGHTS
Although decisions after Gregory involving the clear
statement rule did not address the issue directly, courts
traditionally have regarded state and local correctional facilities
as associated with state sovereignty.59 Courts confronted with
systemic constitutional violations in state prisons described
prison administration as a core state function and, therefore,
noted that the federal judiciary should hesitate to interfere.'
Those same courts, however, often paid homage to federalist
58. In City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, the Court interpreted an
exemption from the Fair Housing Amendments Act's prohibition against
discrimination in housing against people with disabilities. 115 S. Ct. 1776,
1778 (1995) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1)). The city contended that its
ordinance limiting the number of unrelated people in a single family home fell
within the exemption and thus that it did not discriminate in denying a single-
family permit to a group home for recovering addicts. Id. at 1778-79. The
Court held that the exemption should be construed narrowly to preserve the
Act's broad policy of prohibiting discrimination against people with disabilities.
Id. at 1780. The Court distinguished Gregory's preservation of a state
constitutional provision, in contrast to the local ordinance at issue in Oxford
House. Id. at 1780 n.5 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 510 U.S. 452, 460 (1991)).
Repudiating the clear statement rule's applicability to antidiscrimination laws,
the Court relied on a competing canon of statutory interpretation mandating
expansive readings of civil rights legislation. Id. at 1783 n.11. The dissent, in
contrast, argued that Gregory's clear statement rule was particularly necessary
in this context because land use and zoning ordinances were within the historic
powers of the states. Id. at 1786 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
59. For instance, the Court wrote in Preiser v. Rodriguez, "[iut is difficult to
imagine an activity in which a State has a stronger interest, or one that is more
intricately bound up with state laws, regulations, and procedures, than the
administration of its prisons." 411 U.S. 475, 491-92 (1973). In Preiser, the
Court held that when a state prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his
conviction, habeas corpus is his only federal remedy, and thus he must exhaust
his state remedies in state court before proceeding to federal court. Id. at 500.
Preiser, though, was concerned exclusively with the relationship between
federal and state courts, not that between Congress and state executive
agencies. The Supreme Court noted that the problems of prison administration
are "peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of
government," rather than the judiciary. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,
405 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,
413-14 (1989).
60. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987) ("Where a state penal
system is involved, federal courts have... additional reason to accord deference
to the appropriate prison authorities."); Procunier, 416 U.S. at 404-05 ("The
problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and.., they are
not readily susceptible of resolution by decree").
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principles before invalidating state prison policies6' or ordering
massive restructuring with continuing federal judicial over-
sight.6
2
Courts generally have permitted prisoner suits under federal
civil rights statutes.6 For example, the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals upheld without discussion prisoners' right to sue state
prison officials for race discrimination under Title VT of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.64 Several courts explicitly addressed
whether Title IX of the Education Amendments of 197265
applied to women in state prisons, and none found an exemption
for core state functions or correctional facilities to Title IX's
broad mandate forbidding gender discrimination in education.66
Likewise, many state prisoners with disabilities sued prison
officials under the ADA's predecessor statute, § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act.67 Although, most courts allowed these suits
61. See, e.g., Turner, 482 U.S. at 99 (invalidating prison policy of prohibit-
ing inmates' marriages without prison administrators' approval as not
reasonably related to any legitimate penalogical objective). The Court
nonetheless noted that subjecting prison officials' decisions to close judicial
scrutiny can "distort the decisionmaking process" and "seriously hamper" the
ability to confront problems inherent in running prisons. Id. at 89.
62. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1389-90 (S.D. Tex. 1980)
(ordering comprehensive consent decree and appointing special masters to
implement continued federal court oversight of Texas prison system).
63. Courts presumed or stated explicitly that federal antidiscrimination
laws do not implicitly exempt core state functions such as prisons. See, e.g.,
Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that Title IX
of Educational Amendments Act of 1972 contains no specific exemption from
coverage although institutions are explicitly exempted).
64. David K. v. Lane, 839 F.2d 1265, 1274 (7th Cir. 1988). The plaintiffs
alleged that Illinois state prison officials used federal funds to allow race-based
gangs to flourish inside the prison. Id. The court wrote: "It is clear that
plaintiffs may maintain a private cause of action to enforce the regulations
promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act." Id.
65. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994). Unlike Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and Title II of the ADA, Title IX contains specific exemptions from its
coverage. See § 1681(a)(1)-(9) (listing exemptions).
66. See, e.g., Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1224-26 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding Title IX applicable to state prison educational programs); Women
Prisoners v. District of Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634, 672-74 (D.D.C. 1994)
(relying on Jeldness to hold that Title IX applies to prisons and jails); Klinger
v. Nebraska Dep't of Correctional Servs., 824 F. Supp. 1374, 1431-32 (D. Neb.
1993) (relying on precedent to hold courts cannot impose a Title IX exemption
for prisons), rev'd on other grounds, 31 F.3d 727, 733 (8th Cir. 1994).
67. See, e.g., Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1522-24 (11th Cir. 1991)
(permitting HIV-positive prisoners to sue under § 504); Bonner v. Lewis, 857
F.2d 559, 562-64 (9th Cir. 1988) (permitting deaf inmate to sue under § 504);
Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F. Supp. 1190, 1197 (N.D. W. Va. 1976) (granting
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without comment, the Ninth Circuit explicitly held in Bonner v.
Lewis that the Rehabilitation Act protected state inmates with
disabilities." Other federal courts have cited the Ninth
Circuit's analysis in Bonner approvingly.
6 9
Following limited success challenging disability discrimi-
nation under the Rehabilitation Act by prisons that were not
receiving federal funds,7 state prisoners sued under the wider
umbrella of Title II of the ADA.7' Commentators and prisoners'
rights advocates heralded Title II as a more viable remedy than
constitutional litigation for redressing disability discrimi-
nation.72 As in prisoner suits brought under other civil rights
statutes, most defendants in suits brought under the ADA did
not challenge the statute's applicability to state and local
correctional facilities.7 Before the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Torcasio, the only court that squarely confronted a nonapplica-
bility defense held that Title II applied to state and local
summary judgment to inmate with mental illness under § 504 for exclusion
from vocational rehabilitation program).
68. 857 F.2d at 562 (holding the broad language of Rehabilitation Act
covered state prisons and noting the Act's emphasis on rehabilitation and
integration was congruent with rehabilitative goals of state prisons); accord
Donnell C. v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 829 F. Supp. 1016, 1020 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(holding the Rehabilitation Act applied to correctional facilities, including
county juvenile detention center).
69. See, e.g., Harris, 941 F.2d at 1522 n.41; Donnell C., 829 F. Supp. at
1020.
70. By its terms the Rehabilitation Act covers only state entities that
receive federal funding. See supra note 17 (discussing Rehabilitation Act's
limited applicability). Inmates in state prisons that did not receive federal
funding were thus precluded from seeking relief. Because individuals who bring
suit under the Rehabilitation Act are not required to prove a nexus between
federal funding and a specific prison program, however, state prisons' receipt
of any federal fimding made them open to suit. See Gardner, supra note 33, at
188-90 (discussing Rehabilitation Act's coverage of state prisons and federal
funding nexus requirement).
71. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (discussing state prisoner
cases brought under Title II of the ADA). By its terms, Title II does not apply
to inmates in federal prisons. See Crowder v. True, 845 F. Supp. 1250, 1253
(N.D. IlM. 1994).
72. See, e.g., Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Correction
Litigation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 639, 733 (1993) (noting that prisoners' rights
advocates have expressed increasing interest in using statutes, including the
ADA, to challenge prison conditions and services).
73. See, e.g., Harrelson v. Elmore County, 859 F. Supp. 1465 (M.D. Ala.
1994) (lacking any assertion of non-applicability defense); Noland v. Wheatley,
835 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (same).
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correctional facilities.74 The court stated that "under common
usage and understanding of the terms a jail and all of its
facilities ... constitute a service, program, or activity of the
[city] to which the ADA applies."75
Instead, findings that prison officials had qualified immunity
from monetary liability have been the most common barrier to
inmates' disability discrimination claims. Qualified immunity,
also called good faith immunity,76 protects government officials
from suits for monetary damages arising from violations of
constitutional or statutory rights.7  Although the doctrine
emerged in the context of actions against officials for constitu-
tional violations, courts have found qualified immunity equally
available for suits brought under federal statutes that create
rights, such as the ADA. Officials retain qualified immunity
as long as they do not violate a clearly established right.79 If
the "contours" of the right were clearly established at the time
of the alleged violation, officials lose the immunity regardless of
whether they actually knew about the law.80  Commentators
generally agree that the Supreme Court significantly expanded
the scope of qualified immunity recently, making recovery of
74. See Outlaw v. City of Dothan, No. CV-92-A-1219-S, 1993 WL 735802,
at *4 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 27, 1993), noted in Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1348
(4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 772 (1996).
75. Outlaw, 1993 WL 735802, at *4.
76. See ERWIN CHEMERiNSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 474-76 (1994)
(discussing history of qualified immunity doctrine and its transition from
subjective good faith to objective reasonableness standard).
77. The underlying rationale of qualified immunity is two-fold. First, an
official should not be held liable for actions she had no reason to think were
illegal. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974) (noting official
immunity guards against "the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith,
of subjecting to liability an officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his
position, to exercise discretion"). Second, immunity neutralizes the threat that
potential liability will deter an official from "execut[ing] his office with the
decisiveness and the judgement required by the public good." Id.
78. See Noland v. Wheatley, 835 F. Supp. 476, 487-89 (N.D. Ind. 1993)
(holding that qualified immunity generally is available for officials sued under
the ADA, although not in this particular case).
79. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (noting that
immunity fails if official knew or should have known the action violated
constitutional rights).
80. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (holding "[tihe
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right"); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818
(holding that government officials are shielded from liability for civil damages
where "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitu-
tional rights of which a reasonable person would have known").
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monetary damages increasingly difficult for civil rights plain-
tiffs."' Nonetheless, courts have denied qualified immunity to
state and local prison officials when they failed to make any
accommodations for inmate's disability."2
II. THE TORCASIO DECISION
Torcasio filed suit against VDOC officials in 1993,83 alleg-
ing violations of his rights under the ADA84 because officials
failed to accommodate his disability in Keen Mountain Correc-
tional Center's facilities and programming." The VDOC
81. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 76, at 480 (concluding that recent
Supreme Court decisions on qualified immunity issues were strongly pro-
defendant); Leon Friedman, New Developments in Civil Rights Litigation and
Trends in Section 1983 Actions, in 1 SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION
AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 595, 774 (Practicing Law Institute 1994) (same).
82. See, e.g., Noland, 835 F. Supp. at 488 ("Any reasonable person would
have known that a complete lack of effort and outright refusal to accommodate
[plaintiff] violated his rights under the ADA.").
83. Torcasio v. Murray, 862 F. Supp. 1482, 1486 (E.D. Va. 1994), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 57 F.3d 1340 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 772
(1996). Torcasio originally filed a similar complaint relating to his confinement
in VDOC's Greensville Correctional Center. Id. The district court granted
VDOC defendants' motion for summary judgment on the constitutional claims
and dismissed the statutory claims as moot because Torcasio had been
transferred to the Keen Mountain Correctional Center. Id. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the constitu-
tional claims, but it vacated the district court's finding that Torcasio's transfer
rendered the statutory claims moot. Id. The Fourth Circuit remanded the case
for the district court to determine whether the facilities at Keen Mountain were
similar to those at Greensville, and, if so, whether they violated either the ADA
or the Rehabilitation Act. Id.
Meanwhile, Torcasio filed a second complaint alleging similar constitutional
and statutory violations at Keen Mountain. Id. While the remanded case was
pending in the district court, Torcasio was paroled. Id. at 1489. The district
court found that because he was no longer confined at Keen Mountain, he was
no longer entitled to injunctive relief. Id. The Fourth Circuit's decision on
appeal from remand was thus concerned with only monetary damages as
remedy. Torcasio, 57 F.3d at 1342-43.
84. Torcasio also brought suit under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Torcasio, 862 F. Supp. at 1489. The
district court construed Torcasio's complaint to present an additional § 1983
claim for violations by state officials of his statutory rights under the ADA and
the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 1489 n.4. The court did not address whether a
§ 1983 claim premised on ADA violations presented a different standard than
a claim brought directly under Title II of the ADA.
85. Torcasio claimed that the prison failed to reasonably accommodate his
obesity in its facilities-including the shower, toilet, pod tables, cell doors,
building lobby, dining hall, commissary window and pill line, location of his
housing unit, cell itself, and infirmary-and its programming for in-
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officials moved for summary judgment, claiming the ADA does
not apply to state prisons 6 and that the prison officials were
entitled to qualified immunity." The federal district court
denied VDOC officials' motion for summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds as to some of Torcasio's claims.88
The court also denied VDOC's defense that the ADA does not
apply to state prisons.8 9 Its decision relied on the plain lan-
guage of the ADA,9" as well as consistent judicial interpreta-
mates-including indoor and outdoor recreational facilities, medical transpor-
tation, and personal aid. Id. at 1486-89.
86. Id. at 1489. Defendants raised an analogous defense to Torcasio's
Rehabilitation Act claim. Id. at 1490.
87. Id. The district court held that qualified immunity is a defense to
claims brought directly under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, as well as
to those brought under § 1983. Id. at 1491. Although the qualified immunity
doctrine arose in the context of suits alleging violations of constitutional rights,
courts have found that the doctrine extends beyond constitutional claims to
protect officials from suits for damages brought under other statutes, including
the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. See, e.g., Noland v. Wheatley, 835 F. Supp.
476, 488 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (holding that qualified immunity is available to
officials sued under the ADA).
88. The district court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity as to Torcasio's claims for accommodations
regarding his toilet, chair for the pod tables, cell doors, tables for indoor
recreation, his confinement in the infirmary, building lobby, commissary
window and pill line, medical transportation, and personal assistant. Id. at
1494-95. The court also denied qualified immunity as to whether VDOC
officials denied Torcasio extra time to travel between buildings, and the
privileges granted to other inmates in the general population. Id. at 1495.
The district court granted VDOC officials qualified immunity as to
Torcasio's claims involving his shower, outdoor recreation facilities, indoor
recreation activities, the location of his housing unit, and the configuration of
his cell. Id. at 1493-95.
89. Id. at 1491. Likewise, the court denied VDOC's defense that the
Rehabilitation Act does not apply to state prisoners. Id. at 1490. The court
identified the specific right at issue as "a morbidly obese inmate's right to the
modification of specific services and facilities." Id. at 1493. The court found
that although the ADA clearly applied to state prisons, the ADA did not clearly
define the extent of the prison's affirmative duties to a morbidly obese inmate.
Id. at 1493. The court made its factual assessment of the prison's duty to
accommodate in its discussion of whether the defendants engaged in disability
discrimination, not in its general discussion of qualified immunity. See id. at
1492 (finding that the ADA required VDOC to make its facilities readily
accessible to individuals with disabilities and that a reasonable juror could find
VDOC's accommodations unreasonable).
90. Id. at 1490-91. The text of Title II of the ADA, the district court
reasoned, made clear that VDOC fit its definition of public entity: "any state or
local government and any department, agency or special purpose district of a
State or local government." Id. at 1491 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12131). The court
noted that one of the ADA's explicit purposes was to provide a comprehensive
1996] INTERPRETING THE ADA 1201
tions that both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act covered
actions of state prison officials.9 ' VDOC officials subsequently
filed an interlocutory appeal of the partial denial of qualified
immunity to the Fourth Circuit.92
The Fourth Circuit overturned the district court's partial
denial of qualified immunity to the VDOC officials.9 3 The
circuit court found that the applicability of the ADA to state
prisons was not clearly established when the alleged violations
took place and, therefore, the officials were immune from suit for
damages.94 The court applied the clear statement rule95 to
hold that the ADA did not clearly apply to state prisons, despite
Title H's inclusive and seemingly unambiguous language of
coverage. 96 The clear statement rule applies, the court wrote,
in cases that "implicat[e] Congress's historical reluctance to
trench on state legislative prerogatives or to enter into spheres
already occupied by the States."97 Because the court catego-
rized state prisons as a core state function,9" it interpreted
Gregory to require that "Congress must speak unequivocally
before we will conclude that it has 'clearly' subjected state
national mandate for eliminating discrimination against people with disabilities.
Id. (citing § 12101(b)(1)). Moreover, the plain language of the Rehabilitation
Act also counseled for an "expansive interpretation" of regulated entities. Id.
at 1490 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)).
91. Id. at 1490-91 (citing Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1522 (11th Cir.
1991); Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559, 562 (9th Cir. 1988); Candelaria v.
Coughlin, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3999, at *1, *19 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994);
Noland v. Wheatley, 835 F. Supp. 476, 487 (N.D. Ind. 1993); Sites v. McKenzie,
423 F. Supp. 1190, 1197 (N.D. W. Va. 1976)).
92. Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
772 (1996). Officials denied qualified immunity may appeal the decision
immediately because it is an immunity from suit that would be effectively lost
if a case were wrongly permitted to go to trial. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 526-27 (1985).
93. Torcasio, 57 F.3d at 1342.
94. Id.; see also supra note 80 (discussing requirement that contours of
right be clearly established before court may deny official qualified immunity).
95. Torcasio, 57 F.3d at 1346 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460
(1991)).
96. Id. at 1346-47. The court conceded that "certain portions" of both Title
11 and the Rehabilitation Act appear "all-encompassing." Id. at 1344 (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 12131(1); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), (b)(1)(A)). The court was not
persuaded, however, that such language "squarely" extended to state prisons.
Id.
97. Id. at 1345 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1625, 1655
(1995) (Souter, J., dissenting)).
98. Id. The court did not define the characteristics of a core state function
or delineate what separated a core state function from a noncore state function.
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prisons to its enactments."99
The Torcasio court based its assertion that the management
of state prisons was a core state function, and thus a funda-
mental aspect of state sovereignty, largely on traditional comity
principles.00  Relying on precedent limiting the federal
judiciary's involvement in running state prisons,'0 ' the court
stated that principles of comity and federalism applied with
special force to the context of state prisons. 0 2 Requiring state
officials to accommodate inmates with disabilities could signifi-
cantly intrude in prison management'0 3 and, thus, have a
broad impact on federal-state relations. The court interpreted
Gregory as creating a strong presumption against federal
statutory encroachment on traditional arenas of state sover-
eignty,'O4 one that is overcome only through unequivocal
statutory text.10 5 Evaluating the text of Title II, the court
concluded that only a "superficial reading" of the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act supported Torcasio's assertion that the Acts
99. Id. at 1346. The court did not elaborate as to what language would
make the statutory text sufficiently clear.
100. Comity is a doctrine of federal judicial restraint based on mutual
respect between federal and state courts. The Supreme Court has described the
underlying rationale of the comity doctrine as:
a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both
State and National Governments, and in which the National Govern-
ment, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights
and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not
unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
101. Torcasio, 57 F.3d at 1345-46 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85
(1987); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 562 (1979); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974), overruled on
other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989); Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973)).
102. Id. at 1346. The cases the Torcasio court cited dealt exclusively with
federal judicial intervention in state prison management to correct constitu-
tional violations. None of the cases discussed the effect of federal civil rights
statutes on state prison officials' ability to run the facilities, or the role of the
federal judiciary in enforcing such statutes.
103. Id. The application of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act to state
prisons, the court wrote, would have a serious impact on "matters ranging from
cell construction and modification, to inmate assignment, to scheduling, to
security procedures." Id.
104. Id. at 1344-45; cf supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing
commentators' broad and narrow interpretations of Gregory's holding).
105. See Torcasio, 57 F.3d at 1344 ("If Congress intends to alter the usual
constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government, it must
make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.")
(internal quotations omitted).
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"clearly encompass[ed] state prisons and prisoners." °6
Because determining whether a right is clearly established
requires an examination of cases that interpret and define the
contours of the right,"°7 the Torcasio court also evaluated
whether other courts settled the applicability of the ADA to state
prisons.'08  The court suggested that Torcasio could have
overcome the "facial ambiguity" of the statutory text by demon-
strating that courts uniformly interpreted the ADA to apply to
state prisons,'0 9 or that the implementing regulations made its
coverage of state prisons clear."0  The court noted, however,
that almost every court simply assumed the ADA covered state
prisons without squarely addressing the issue."' Although the
Ninth Circuit held explicitly that the Rehabilitation Act pro-
tected state prisoners," the Torcasio court emphasized that
the only court directly addressing the ADA's applicability to
state prisons did so in an unpublished opinion." 3 Moreover,
Title U's implementing regulations failed to convince the court
that the ADA covered state prisons.1
4
106. Id. at 1347.
107. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text (discussing qualifiedimmunity doctrine).
108. Torcasio, 57 F.3d at 1347-49.
109. Id. at 1347.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1347-49.
112. Id. at 1349 (discussing Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1988)).
Highlighting the Ninth Circuit's observation in a subsequent case interpreting
the Rehabilitation Act, the Torcasio court stated: "The Act was not designed to
deal specifically with the prison environment.... There is no indication that
Congress intended the Act to apply to prison facilities irrespective of the
reasonable requirements of effective prison administration." Id. at 1349 n.7
(citing Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446-47 (9th Cir. 1994)). The Ninth
Circuit, however, did not hold in Gates that the Rehabilitation Act did not apply
to state prisons, but rather that the standard of review of a prisoner's statutory
rights under the Rehabilitation Act is equivalent to the standard of review for
alleged constitutional violations in prison. Gates, 39 F.3d at 1447.
113. Torcasio, 57 F.3d at 1347-48 (citing Outlaw v. City of Dothan, No. CV-
92-A-1219-S, 1993 WL 735802, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 27 1993)). The court noted
that unpublished opinions are an "unusually ineffective, and even counterpro-
ductive" means of showing that a right was clearly established. Id.
114. Id. at 1350-52. Title Irs regulations incorporated those of the
Rehabilitation Act, which did not mention correctional facilities. Id. at 1350-51.
The ADA's Accessibility Guidelines, including requirements for newly
constructed correctional facilities, were strictly advisory until the Department
of Justice issued final regulations. Id. at 1351-52 (citing 36 C.F.R. Pt. 1191,
App. A; 59 Fed. Reg. 31,676 (1994)). The court concluded, therefore, that the
ADA's applicability to state prisons was not sufficiently clearly established to
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After determining that the ADA did not clearly apply to
state prisons, the court discussed VDOC's other defenses. Again
relying on limited discussions in earlier cases, the court found
that the ADA's coverage of morbid obesity as a disability was not
clearly established."' A reasonable prison administrator, the
court reasoned, could believe that a morbidly obese inmate was
not disabled."6 The court thus held that the VDOC officials
were immune from Torcasio's suit because the ADA's coverage
of his disability was not clearly established."7
Finally, the court reviewed VDOC officials' attempts to
accommodate Torcasio's alleged disability. Utilizing traditional
qualified immunity analysis, the court found that officials at the
Keen Mountain facility reasonably could have believed that
providing Torcasio with a hospital bed, reinforced chairs, and
handrails and slip mats in the shower were sufficient and
reasonable modifications." 8 Because case law had not clearly
developed the contours of the ADA's rights, the court concluded,
VDOC officials deserved qualified immunity as to all of
Torcasio's claims."9
III. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN ANALYZING THE
ADA'S INAPPLICABILITY TO STATE PRISONS
Courts confronting whether the ADA applies to state prisons
should reject the Fourth Circuit's analysis and holding in
Torcasio for three reasons. First, the Fourth Circuit should not
have addressed the issue of the ADA's inapplicability to state
prisons because two narrower grounds each would have pro-
duced the same result. Second, even if it reached the applica-
bility issue correctly, the court erred in employing the clear
statement rule to interpret statutory text that unequivocally
indicated the ADA's broad scope. Finally, the court should not
have used the clear statement rule to interpret the ADA because
the federal government's interest in eliminating disability
discrimination outweighs states' interest in efficient prison
management. The court's application of the clear statement rule
justify the district court's partial denial of qualified immunity to the VDOC
officials. Id. at 1352.
115. Id. at 1353-54.
116. Id. at 1354-55.
117. Id. at 1355.
118. Id. at 1355-56.
119. Id. at 1356.
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created a misguided analytical framework that undermines Title
I's uniform and comprehensive antidiscrimination protections
for people with disabilities and has serious ramifications beyond
the context of state prisons.
A. RELYING ON NARROWER GROUNDS WOULD HAVE
PRODUCED THE SAME RESULT
Fundamentally, the Torcasio court sought to preserve state
officials' freedom to determine and implement the most effective
forms of prison administration.12 Finding that the ADA's
applicability to state prisons was not clearly established when
Torcasio requested accomniodations for his disability enabled the
court to limit federal interference with state prison management.
The court, however, could have achieved the same result,
holding VDOC officials not liable for Torcasio's damages claim,
without finding the ADA applied to state prisons. The court had
available two other avenues to the same end: Title II's "reason-
able modification" standard and the qualified immunity doctrine.
1. VDOC Met the ADA's "Reasonable Modification" Standard
Title II's implementing regulations require a public entity to
make reasonable modifications in its policies, practices, and
procedures unless the modifications or accommodations would
fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or
activity." If a public entity demonstrates that a proposed
modification would change the entire focus of the program, or
create an undue burden or hardship, courts have not required
the government agency to make the modification.'22 This
standard incorporates considerations of context in evaluating
whether a proposed accommodation is reasonable."
120. See id. at 1345 ("That the management of state prisons is to be left to
the states, as free as possible of federal interference, is confirmed by a long line
of Supreme Court precedent.").
121. Title II defines "qualified individuals with a disability" as persons who
"with or without reasonable modifications" to the program, policy, or procedure
are qualified to participate or receive its benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1); see 28
C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (refining and implementing reasonable modification
standard).
122. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the reasonable
modification standard).
123. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing courts' interpre-
tations of reasonable accommodation standard under the Rehabilitation Act and
Title H).
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Thus, the heightened administrative and security concerns
of a state prison should factor into a court's determination of
whether a particular accommodation is reasonable.'2 Other
courts addressing the reasonable accommodation issue within
the prison setting provided guidance for balancing competing
interests when evaluating prison officials' attempts to address
the needs of inmates with disabilities. 125  For instance, courts
factored in the heightened risk of HIV-transmission when
assessing prison accommodations of HIV-positive inmates. 26
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that VDOC officials
fulfilled several of Torcasio's requests even before he filed
suit. 2  Prison administrators placed him in a private cell
originally designed for two inmates, provided him with a full-size
hospital bed with railings, put reinforced chairs in his cell and
dining area, and installed slip mats and handrails in the
shower."2  The court also alluded to the limits that security
concerns place on prison administrators' ability to accommodate
prisoners with disabilities. 29  The court, however, never
124. See supra note 24 (discussing courts' evaluation of the role of
administrative concerns in determining whether an accommodation was
reasonable).
125. Courts interpreting the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act in the prison
context recognized these constraints and permitted officials to avoid certain
accommodations altogether. Cf supra notes 33-34 (discussing requested and
required accommodations in suits brought under ADA and Rehabilitation Act).
126. See, e.g., Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1526-27 (11th Cir. 1991)
(assessing prison's duty to accommodate under Rehabilitation Act). The
Eleventh Circuit noted that the risk of introducing HIV-positive prisoners into
the general inmate population could pose a serious threat of violence. Id. at
1518. Moreover, the court wrote, prisons are places of high-risk behavior for
HIV transmission. Id. at 1519. Nonetheless, the Harris court ordered the
district court to assess specific programs, such as college classes, to determine
whether the prison could minimize the legitimate risks and accommodate HIV-
positive prisoners. Id. at 1526 n.47, 1527; see also Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d
1439, 1445, 1447-48 (9th Cir. 1994) (weighing in its reasonable accommodation
assessment risk of violence if BIV-positive inmates were placed in food service
jobs).
127. Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1342 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 772 (1996).
'128. Id. at 1356. When Torcasio first arrived at Keen Mountain, prison
officials placed him in the infirmary, which contained many modifications to
make it accessible for prisoners with disabilities. Id. Because inmates living
in the infirmary had more restrictions and fewer privileges, Torcasio requested
to move into the general population. Id.
129. Id. at 1345-46. The court later cited the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the
Rehabilitation Act's applicable standard in the prison setting: "There is no
indication that Congress intended the [Rehabilitation] Act to apply to prison
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incorporated the prison's legitimate security or administrative
concerns into its analysis of the reasonableness of the accommo-
dations. Had the court done so, it could have concluded, for
example, that Torcasio's request for a personal attendant was
unreasonable in light of the prison's staffing limitations, or
alternatively, because such specialized treatment might arouse
jealously and violence among the other inmates.
Only after concluding that Title II did not clearly cover state
prisons did the Fourth Circuit address the reasonableness of
VDOC's modifications. Because the court ultimately found that
VDOC's accommodations were, in fact, reasonable within the
requirements of Title II,130 it had no need to address whether
Title Irs coverage extended to state prisons. Had the court
based its decision solely on the narrower issue of the reasonable-
ness of the prison's modifications, it could have found VDOC
officials not liable for damages without determining that Title
II's applicability was clearly established law.
2. VDOC Officials' Actions Were Reasonable Under the
Qualified Immunity Doctrine
Alternatively, the Torcasio court could have focused
exclusively on whether VDOC officials met the existing standard
for qualified immunity based on the accommodations they made
before Torcasio filed suit. 3 ' Qualified immunity casts a broad
net and generally protects individual officials from monetary
liability unless the right at issue has been defined with consider-
able precision." 2 Because qualified immunity protects all
facilities irrespective of the reasonable requirements of effective prison adminis-
tration.'" Id. at 1346 (quoting Gates, 39 F.3d at 1447). The Fourth Circuit
nonetheless failed to acknowledge that its citation from Gates undermined its
reasoning about the ADA's inapplicability to state prisons and provided clear
precedent for incorporating prison management concerns into Title Is
reasonable accommodation requirement. See supra note 112 (discussing Gates's
holding).
130. See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text (discussing court's
assessment of reasonableness of VDOC's accommodations).
131. Under the qualified immunity doctrine, government actors have
considerable leeway in exercising their discretion and are immune from damage
actions unless they violate clearly established rights. See supra notes 79-80, 82
and accompanying text (discussing qualified immunity determinations and
parameters of "clearly established" law).
132. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court's expansion of qualified immunity's protections).
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officials who have not violated clearly established rights,' the
court had no need to reach the broad conclusion that the ADA
was not clearly applicable to state prisons.
In claims brought under the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act, courts denied qualified immunity to prison officials when
they failed to make any accommodations for an inmate's
disability." Courts have not defined the contours of many of
the ADA's rights because it is a relatively new law. Although a
few cases granted prisoners specific rights, 3 ' case law is
insufficiently developed to consider many specific rights guaran-
teed under the ADA "clearly established" for qualified immunity
purposes. 36
The Torcasio court could have grounded its decision solely
on VDOC officials' qualified immunity for their actions at Keen
Mountain prison. 7 When the case reached the Fourth Cir-
cuit, only Torcasio's claims for monetary damages remained. 3 '
Unlike earlier cases that denied officials qualified immunity
from claims brought under the ADA, VDOC officials attempted
to accommodate some of Torcasio's requests.'39 The Fourth
Circuit could have analyzed the accommodations VDOC officials
made, found that their actions did not violate any clearly
established right, 4 ° and thus hold that qualified immunity
133. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text (discussing qualified
immunity doctrine).
134. See supra note 82 (discussing outcome of qualified immunity determi-
nations in ADA and Rehabilitation Act cases).
135. For example, much of the case law developed under the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act has created rights of deaf prisoners to interpreter services
and assistive technologies. See Gardner, supra note 33, at 191-94 (discussing
cases brought under ADA and Rehabilitation Act).
136. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (discussing "clearly
established" requirement of qualified immunity doctrine).
137. The court examined in detail whether the ADA was even applicable to
state prisons before basing its holding on qualified immunity. See supra Part
II (setting forth Torcasio court's reasoning).
138. Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1342-43 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 772 (1996).
139. See supra notes 118, 127-128 and accompanying text (discussing
VDOC's officials accommodations).
140. The court based its holding on qualified immunity doctrine, but it held
that Title II's applicability to state prisons was not clearly established law.
Torcasio, 57 F.3d at 1352. The court wrote, "Ib]ecause we find that the
applicability of the [ADA and Rehabilitation Act] to prisons was not clearly
established at the time in question, it follows a fortiori that the more specific
right of prisoners to the particular accommodations requested by Torcasio was
likewise not clearly established." Id. at 1352 n.12.
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rendered the officials immune from suit for damages. This
alternative holding would have allowed the court to recognize
that the ADA applies to state prisons while immunizing VDOC
officials from monetary liability. This holding also would leave
available the possibility of finding officials liable for future
egregious conduct.
B. THE ToRcAsio COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE CLEAR
STATEMENT RULE PROPERLY
Assuming arguendo that the Torcasio court correctly
addressed whether the ADA covered state prisons, the court
should not have employed the clear statement rule to interpret
Title IIs unambiguous applicability provision. The Fourth
Circuit should have recognized Title Irs applicability to state
prisons and therefore declined to employ the clear statement
rule. Moreover, the Torcasio court emphasized the constraints
compliance with the ADA would place on state prisons, and used
those implications to justify applying the clear statement rule.
As a result, the Torcasio court expanded beyond established
precedent the realm of state activities meriting the clear
statement rule's protections.
1. Title Irs Coverage Provision Is Unambiguous, Therefore
Obviating the Clear Statement Rule
The clear statement rule, like other canons of statutory
interpretation, is a tool used to interpret ambiguous statutory
language."" The rule creates a presumption that helps deter-
mine the meaning of words or phrases that are subject to more
than one interpretation.'42 The threshold interpretive issue is,
therefore, whether particular statutory text is ambiguous.
The Supreme Court in Gregory used the clear statement rule
to determine the meaning of "policymaker" as an exception to
the broad coverage of the ADEA,'4 a term susceptible to
141. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (locating the clear
statement rule in context of the canons of statutory interpretation).
142. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text (analyzing courts' use of
clear statement rule after Gregory).
143. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 467 (1991). The Court had to
determine whether appointed state judges fit into the ADEA's exemption for
"'appointee[s] on the policymaking level.'" Id. at 465 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 630(f)
(1994)).
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varying interpretations and applicability.'TM Significantly, the
Court did not use the clear statement rule to interpret the
ADEA's broad coverage provision that included "a State or
political subdivision of a State"'45 within its definition of
employers. Presumably, the meaning of the latter phrase was
readily apparent to the Court. Likewise, lower courts have
found other examples of expansive language defining the reach
of federal statutes sufficiently unambiguous to meet the clear
statement rule's standard 4 ' or to avoid application of the rule
altogether.4 '
The heart of the Torcasio decision focuses on language in
Title H that is virtually identical to the ADEA's broad coverage
provision that the Supreme Court tacitly approved in Gregory.
Title Is provision prohibits discrimination based on disability
by "any State or local government" and "any department, agency
... or other instrumentality of a State or States or local
government." 48 The statute's definition of a public entity
includes "any department ... of a State."'49 Common usage as
well as common sense dictate that the Virginia Department of
Corrections is a "department... of a State" and therefore subject
to Title Irs prohibition against discrimination based on disa-
144. See id. at 465 (describing petitioners' and respondent's conflicting
interpretations of "policymaking").
145. Id. at 456 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2) (1994)).
146. Confronted with even broader and less precise language, the Second
Circuit found the Voting Rights Act's prohibition against state voting
requirements that result in denial or abridgement of the right to vote on
account of race a sufficiently clear statement under Gregory to shift the balance
of power between the federal government and the states. Baker v. Cuomo, 58
F.3d 814, 825 (2d Cir. 1995); see also supra note 55 and accompanying text
(discussing the court's reasoning in Baker and use of clear statement rule).
Similarly, a district court found the Fair Labor Standards Act's definition of
covered employees a sufficiently clear statement under Gregory to extend to
state law enforcement officials, despite the state's contention that law
enforcement is a traditional state government function. Schmitt v. Kansas, 844
F. Supp. 1449, 1455 (D. Kan. 1994); accord Ackley v. Department of Corrections,
844 F. Supp. 680, 685 (D. Kan. 1994).
147. Interpreting another provision of the ADEA, the First Circuit found that
Congress's intent (as manifested in the statutory text) to protect state police
officers from mandatory retirement rendered the use of the clear statement rule
unnecessary. Gately v. Massachusetts, 2 F.3d 1221, 1230 (1st Cir. 1993). The
court reasoned that the rule only applies where congressional intent as revealed
in the text was ambiguous. Id.; see also supra note 56 and accompanying text
(discussing the court's reasoning in Gately and assessment of clear statement
rule's applicability to interpret ADEA).




bility. The court's conclusion that this language is not suffi-
ciently clear for a reasonable prison official to know that the
ADA covers state prisons is not congruent with the plain
meaning of the statutory text or prior decisions. Title Irs
language appears at least as clear as the ADEA's coverage
provision defining a state as an employer that the Gregory Court
found acceptable; indeed, the language is probably more clear.
If the Supreme Court construed "a State or political subdivision
of a State" to cover the state judiciary without ambiguity, the
Fourth Circuit should have understood "any department.., of
a State" to apply unambiguously to state department of correc-
tions officials. The Torcasio court should have followed the
Supreme Court's lead in Gregory and found Title Is coverage
provision sufficiently clear to obviate the application of the clear
statement rule.
The Torcasio court instead held that Title II would have to
contain a "far clearer expression of congressional intent"1 50 to
find the provision sufficiently unambiguous to pass muster under
the clear statement rule. It is unclear how the ADA could
contain a "far clearer expression of congressional intent" without
including an enumerated list of covered state and municipal
entities. The court noted in a footnote that "although the
definition of 'public entity' contained in Title II of the ADA is a
broad one, it is still true that prisons are not expressly men-
tioned in the statute." 5' In fact, Title II does not list any
specific departments or agencies as covered entities.'52 Con-
ventions of statutory interpretation suggest that the Torcasio
court should not have read such criteria into Title II where none
existed in the text of the statute.'53
150. Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1344 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 772 (1996).
151. Id. at 1346 n.5.
152. In contrast, Title III of the ADA (Public Accommodations) contains a list
of twelve types of public accommodations subject to the ADA. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12181(7)(A)-(L) (1994). Similarly, Title I (Employment) specifically exempts
certain employers. Id. at § 12111(5)(B); see also supra note 18 (discussing
coverage provisions and exemptions in Titles I and HI of ADA). Therefore,
Congress knew how to draft coverage provisions that provided specific guidance
as to their scope.
153. A standard canon of statutory interpretation mandates that if a statute
includes specific exemptions from its coverage, courts should not create
additional exemptions. See, e.g., Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608,
616-17 (1980), cited in Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1226 (9th Cir. 1994)
("Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general
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2. The Court Erred in Focusing on the Federalist
Implications of State Prison's Compliance with the ADA
Rather than Focusing on the Text of the Statute
Rather than carefully analyzing Title Irs text, the Torcasio
court focused on the ramifications for prison administrators of
accommodating inmates' disabilities. This approach miscon-
strued the proper use of the clear statement rule, which has
been limited to situations of genuine textual uncertainty.' In
the Fourth Circuit's analysis, the clear statement rule lost its
connection to the statutory text and operated as a quasi-
substantive Tenth Amendment protection for realms of tradi-
tional state authority. The decision thus reinvigorated in the
realm of statutory interpretation an analysis that the Supreme
Court explicitly rejected in its Tenth Amendment jurispru-
dence.' 55
In Gregory, the Supreme Court predicated its use of the
clear statement rule on a strong link between fundamental
attributes of state sovereignty, requiring the clear statement
rule's protection, and functions tied to representative govern-
ment.156  Likewise, lower courts held that federal legislation
must impinge on "the heart of representative government"5 '
or a state's "self-identification as a sovereign" 8 before courts
employ the clear statement rule. Areas traditionally within the
realm of state authority, such as land use, were clearly distin-
guishable from representative government to require application
prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of a
contrary legislative intent.") (citation omitted); see also supra note 66 and
accompanying text (discussing courts' use of this canon to interpret Title IX to
conclude it covers state prisons).
154. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text (analyzing portions of
statutory text to which courts have applied clear statement rule).
155. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court's rejection in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority of
core state function analysis in Tenth Amendment cases).
156. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (discussing Gregory's
articulation of the realm of traditional state functions that clear statement rule
protects).
157. See supra note 56 (discussing First Gibralter Bank v. Morales and clear
statement rule's applicability only to state functions at heart of representative
government).
158. See supra note 56 (discussing United States v. Lot 5, Fox Grove's
interpretation of Gregory, and clear statement rule's applicability only to
functions that are linked to states' definition as sovereign).
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of the rule.'59 These courts thus conclusively rejected an
expansive notion of state functions in the context of applying the
clear statement rule.
The Torcasio court, in stark contrast, began its analysis
assuming that state prisons were somehow different than other
state entities: "Were we presented with the question of whether
[the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act] apply to a state entity
other than a prison, we might come to our task with a somewhat
different jurisprudential mindset."6 ° Because the manage-
ment of state prisons is a core state function, the court reasoned,
it is an attribute of state sovereignty that compels the court to
apply the clear statement rule.'6 ' The court, however, did not
attempt to define the parameters or attributes of a core state
function. Instead, to support its determination, the court cited
dicta from a series of prison-reform cases and concluded that
state prisons must be as free from federal interference as
possible.'62 Many of the cases cited ironically involved federal
judicial interference with state prisons, and some of the reme-
dies included massive restructuring of prison conditions with
management dictated and supervised by federal courts. 6 3 The
Torcasio court's reliance on these cases undercut its rationale for
using the clear statement rule because precedent shows that
prisons are not insulated from federal encroachment by some
inherent link to state autonomy.
The court used the federalist implications of allowing the
ADA to reach state prisons to create textual ambiguity where
none was present.'" The Torcasio decision's reliance on the
"core state function" analysis broke from consistent interpre-
tations of the clear statement rule. The court's assertion that
prisons are core state functions, thus meriting federal court
159. See supra note 56 (analyzing courts' determinations of what constitutes
a core state function).
160. Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1344 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 772 (1996).
161. Id. at 1345-46.
162. See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text (discussing the Torcasio
court's use of prison cases to support its determination that prisons are core
state functions).
163. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing the role of prison
cases in Torcasio court's analysis). None of the cases cited by the Torcasio court
involved congressional interference with state prisons; instead, the cases
addressed constitutional violations.
164. See supra part mH.B.1. (discussing lack of textual ambiguity in Title Irs
coverage provision).
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protection, raised the same issues the Supreme Court encoun-
tered in its Tenth Amendment jurisprudence: the inability to
create a workable definition of the attributes of state sovereignty
that deserve federalist protection. State prisons are far-removed
from "the heart of representative government," the definition
other courts used when employing the clear statement rule.'65
Whether state prisons are required to accommodate inmates
with disabilities does not ensure that states are more responsive
to their constituents, nor does it hinder states' ability to set
qualifications for important policy-making positions. The Fourth
Circuit should have recognized that state prisons are not
institutions intimately linked to state representative functions
and thus are subject to federal antidiscrimination statutes like
the ADA.
C. THE TORCASIO COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE USED THE
CLEAR STATEMENT RULE TO INTERPRET THE ADA
Regardless of whether Title II's coverage provision is
sufficiently ambiguous to require the use of the clear statement
rule, the Torcasio court should not have applied the rule at all.
Courts have rejected using the clear statement rule to interpret
statutes enacted under Congress's powers under the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments.'66 The Torcasio court thus di-
verged from consistent interpretations of Gregory by using the
clear statement rule to protect a state agency not fundamental
to state sovereignty from an antidiscrimination statute enacted
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court erred in elevating
the state's interest in autonomy over the federal government's
weightier interest in preventing discrimination against people
with disabilities.
1. Courts Have Declined to Apply the Clear Statement Rule
to Legislation Enacted Under the Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment contains a broad grant of power
to Congress to legislate in areas traditionally reserved to the
165. See supra note 56 (discussing courts' interpretations of what state
government functions are sufficiently linked to state sovereignty to require use
of clear statement rule).
166. See supra notes 55, 58 and accompanying text (discussing courts'




states. 67 The Supreme Court held that Congress may legis-
late to ensure equal protection of the laws, even if the result is
preempting state law or practices that do not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.' The Court in Gregory noted that
the federalism interests underlying the clear statement rule are
"attenuated" when Congress acts under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
169
Given the lessened state sovereignty interests at stake when
Congress uses its Fourteenth Amendment powers, the Court has
twice declined to use the clear statement rule to interpret
antidiscrimination legislation that nonetheless had a profound
impact on core state functions. In Chisom v. Roemer, the Court
stated that Congress adopted the Voting Rights Act for crucial
remedial purposes and, therefore, courts should interpret the Act
to provide the broadest possible scope to prevent race discrimi-
nation.' In dissent, Justice Scalia explained that the majori-
ty refused to apply the clear statement rule to the Voting Rights
Act because it was a Fourteenth Amendment enactment.'
17
Echoing this sentiment, the Court in City of Edmonds v. Oxford
House, Inc. used a competing canon of statutory interpretation
stating that antidiscrimination laws warranted "generous
construction" to construe the Fair Housing Act.' 2 The Oxford
House decision was especially significant because the Court
interpreted provisions of the Act that prohibit discrimination
167. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see also supra note 35 and accompanying
text (describing Supreme Court's sanction of expanding federal power under
Fourteenth Amendment). The Fifteenth Amendment contains a similar
enforcement authorization. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
168. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's power
under Fourteenth Amendment to extend equal protection doctrine).
169. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 468 (1991).
170. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403 (1991).
171. See Chisom, 501 U.S. at 412 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that
Fourteenth Amendment can be used to distinguish Chisom from Gregory). The
Voting Rights Act, however, was enacted under the Fifteenth Amendment. See
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 38, at 646 ("Contrary to Justice Scalia's
comment, the Voting Rights Act was adopted pursuant to the Fifteenth
Amendment, but that does not change the analysis.") In contrast, when the
Gregory Court applied the clear statement rule, it presumed that Congress
enacted the ADEA under its Commerce Clause authority. Gregory, 501 U.S. at
464.
172. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, 115 S. Ct. 1776, 1783 n.11 (1995); see
also supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing Oxford House's rejection
of clear statement rule to interpret antidiscrimination legislation).
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against people with disabilities.'73
Following the Supreme Court's implicit rejection of using the
clear statement rule to interpret antidiscrimination legislation,
lower courts declined to employ it as well. At least one lower
court rejected outright application of the rule to the Voting
Rights Act. In League of United Latin American Citizens
(LULAC) v. Clements, the Fifth Circuit restricted use of the clear
statement rule to construing Commerce Clause legislation that
interfered with states' ability to determine the qualifications of
state officials. 74 The court relied on Congress's use of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to enact the Voting
Rights Act and held the clear statement rule inapplicable
because those amendments expanded federal power over the
states. 75
Unlike the Fifth Circuit in LULAC, the Torcasio court failed
to recognize that Congress enacted Title II of the ADA under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The ADA states that Congress
"invok[ed] the sweep of congressional authority, including the
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment ... in order to
address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by
people with disabilities." 76 By using the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Congress sought to intrude in areas of traditional state
authority and subject them to uniform provisions prohibiting
discrimination based on disability. 77 The Torcasio court failed
to recognize that states' interests are limited when weighed
against the broad federal interest in enforcing the Equal
Protection Clause. By declining to address the countervailing
federal interest at stake, the court mistakenly applied the clear
statement rule contrary to precedent.
2. Policy Considerations Dictate that Courts Should Not Use
the Clear Statement Rule to Interpret the ADA
The Torcasio court's holding that the ADA did not clearly
apply to state prisons fundamentally disrupted the ADA's
173. See id. at 1779-80 (describing facts of Oxford House in context of Fair
Housing Act provision, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1)).
174. LULAC, 986 F.2d 728, 758-59 (5th Cir. 1993).
175. Id. at 760.
176. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994).
177. See supra notes 16-17, 19-23 and accompanying text (describing
Congress's intent in enacting ADA).
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comprehensive remedial purpose.17 It left inmates who are
discriminated against on the basis of disability without a
comprehensive statutory remedy.79 Inmates discriminated
against on the basis of race or gender, in contrast, have some
recourse under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or Title
IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, respectively. 8 °
In fact, the Fourth Circuit subsequently relied on its decision in
Torcasio to hold that a Virginia inmate had no claim against
state prison officials under the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act. 8 ' Several federal district courts also have used Torcasio
to hold the ADA does not protect inmates with disabilities.
8 2
This result and the Torcasio decision itself conflict with
Congress's express intent to provide victims of disability
discrimination with remedies similar to those available to
victims of other forms of discrimination.1
83
More significantly, the Torcasio decision's reliance on the
clear statement rule to interpret the ADA created an unprece-
dented analysis that threatens Title Irs applicability to all
putative core state functions. Using the court's reasoning, Title
II could be restricted from covering licensing boards, police
departments, parks and recreation programs, and other tradi-
tional arenas of state police power.'" Courts could exempt
entire portions of state and local governments from the ADA's
mandates. Judicially created exemptions could thus recreate the
patchwork of coverage that existed before the ADA. 8'
178. See supra Part I-A. (discussing ADA's history and Congress's purpose
in enacting comprehensive legislation prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of disability).
179. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanyingtext (comparingADA to earlier
antidiscrimination legislation).
180. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text (analyzing federal
statutes available for state inmates alleging race or gender discrimination).
181. Garrett v. Murray, 70 F.3d 111, 1995 WL 684077 (4th Cir. 1995) (per
curiam) (unpublished disposition).
182. See Little v. Lycoming County, 912 F. Supp. 809, 819-20 (M.D. Pa.
1996); Staples v. Virginia Dep't of Corrections, 904 F. Supp. 487, 490 n.1 (E.D.
Va. 1995).
183. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text (setting forth Congress's
intent to draft comprehensive civil rights legislation to protect people with
disabilities).
184. See supra notes 37, 51 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme
Court's identification of areas of traditional state authority in Tenth Amend-
ment case law).
185. See supra notes 17,25 and accompanyingtext (discussing Rehabilitation
Act's limited coverage of state and local government entities).
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Congress, however, explicitly enacted the ADA to subject
state and local governments to uniform standards prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of disability.' Decrying the lack
of consistency under the Rehabilitation Act, the House Education
Committee Report stated, "[t]he resulting inconsistent treatment
of people with disabilities by different State or local government
agencies is both inequitable and illogical for a society committed
to full access for people with disabilities."' Both the congres-
sional findings that form the introduction to the statute and the
copious legislative history attest to the overwhelming history of
disability discrimination Congress sought to remedy.'8 Fur-
thermore, state and local governments historically engaged in
egregious discrimination against people with disabilities,'
and thus should be subjected to comprehensive and uniform
antidiscrimination laws. The Torcasio court's result contravenes
the ADA's explicit purpose of creating an overarching federal
mandate to eliminate discrimination against people with
disabilities.
CONCLUSION
The Torcasio court erred in finding that the ADA's applica-
bility to state prisons was not clearly established law. The court
should not have used the clear statement rule to interpret Title
II: narrower grounds were available to reach the same result,
the statute's coverage was unmistakably clear, and Congress
enacted the ADA intending to encroach on areas of traditional
state authority. The Torcasio court elevated the state's interest
in running its prison system free from federal interference at the
expense of an overriding federal interest in enforcing national
standards prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability.
Its analysis created precedent that jeopardizes Title II's applica-
bility to other state or local government entities that could be
deemed core state functions.
The court should have protected VDOC officials from civil
186. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (discussing the history of
discrimination against people with disabilities that Congress sought to remedy
by enacting the ADA).
187. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 16, at 37, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 319.
188. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text (reviewing Congress's fact
finding and assessment of discrimination faced by people with disabilities).
189. See Cook, supra note 23, at 404-14 (describing history and continuing
legacy of government segregation of people with disabilities).
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damages by finding either that their accommodations of
Torcasio's disability were reasonable within the context of the
state prison's security concerns, or that their actions did not
violate any clearly established rights and were thus protected by
qualified immunity. In the future, courts interpreting Title II
should reject the use of the clear statement rule. They should
rely instead on the ADA's unambiguous text, unequivocal
legislative history, and unmistakable purpose of creating a
national mandate to rectify pervasive discrimination against
people with disabilities. As a result, courts will maintain the
appropriate federal-state balance, fulfill congressional intent,
and preserve a more uniform judicial enforcement of the ADA.

